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Tax Evasion and
Social Security Abuse -
Some Tentative Observations
Reuben Hasson
In this article, Professor Hasson finds that in the
area of social security abuse the most serious pro-
blems arise not because people are abusing social
security programs but because people who qualify
for benefits are not receiving them. He also notes
that the government commits enormous resources
to policing social security schemes and advertising
the seriousness of such abuse, and that civil ser-
vants are often instructed to, in effect, mistreat
claimants. In contrast, the government loses
billions of dollars annually through tax evasion
while failing to take a number of obvious steps to
reduce its incidence. Furthermore, many people
appear to view tax evasion with equanimity. The
author explores the possible reasons for this
perception. He concludes that tax evasion is a
much more serious crime than social security
abuse, and that at the very least tax evaders and
social security abusers ought to be treated equally.
Reuben Hasson is a professor of law at
Osgoode Hall Law School.
The task of comparing welfare abuse with tax eva-
sion is a challenging one,I fraught with formidable dif-
ficulties.
First, there is no consensus as to what constitutes
abuse. Thus, some people think tax avoidance is un-
doubtedly an abuse, 2 whereas many sane, law abiding
people see tax avoidance as being socially and ethically
desirable.' To take an example from the welfare law
field - drawing compensation simultaneously from two
social security programs is regarded by some as being
socially undesirable, others view it with equanimity.
Assuming that a definition could be agreed upon, a
second difficulty in this field is simply the difficulty of
measuring the extent of abuse. This difficulty frustrated
even the British Royal Committee on the Abuse of
Social Security Benefits (the Fisher Committee). 4 After
hearing evidence from government departments, social
work agencies, Members of Parliament and anyone who
had an interest in the subject, the Committee concluded:
It would be very desirable, if it were possible, to know ex-
actly how much abuse of the social system by wrongful
claims actually goes on. So long as knowledge of the full ex-
tent of abuse is incomplete and fragmentary, any judgment
as to how serious a problem it is and what resources it is
justifiable to devote to alternative means of suppressing it
must be based on impression and guess work.'
The difficulty in estimating the extent and cost of
welfare abuse is infinitely greater in a federal country
such as Canada than in a unitary country such as the
United Kingdom. Whereas social security is centrally ad-
ministered in the United Kingdom, the administration
of social welfare in Canada is divided between federal,
provincial and municipal governments in a scheme of
frightening complexity.6
Measuring tax evasion is as difficult as measuring
1. For an attempt to compare attitudes to tax abuse with those
prevailing with regard to welfare fraud in the United Kingdom,
see F. Field, M. Meacher and C. Pond, To Him Who Hath: A
Study of Poverty and Taxation. Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books, 1977, ch. 8.
2. See, e.g., F. Field et al., supra note 1; Christopher, "Tax
Avoidance," in F. Field (ed.), The Wealth Report. London: Ar-
row Books, 1979; and National Council of Welfare, The Hidden
Welfare System. Ottawa, 1976 and The Hidden Welfare System
Revisited. Ottawa, 1979.
3. See, e.g., Angell, "Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance" 34 Colum-
bia Law Review 80 (1934); Vineberg, "The Ethics of Tax Plan-
ning," [1979] British Tax Review 31; Flesch, "Tax Avoidance:
The Attitude of the Courts and the Legislature," [1968] Current
Legal Problems 215. (This last article condones tax avoidance as
a response to "penal" rates of taxation.)
4. Gt. Brit., Report of the Royal Committee on the Abuse of Social
Security Benefits (the Fisher Report), Cmnd. 5228. London:
H.M.S.O., 1973.
5. Id., p. 209, para. 446. The Committee did recommend that the
Department of Social Security carry out a random survey of
those receiving benefits. The Minister of the day objected that a
random survey of this sort would cause offence to the many in-
nocent people who would inevitably be selected. For a criticism
of this argument, see the perceptive note on the Report by Reid
in 2 Industrial L.J. 174 (1973).
6. For an introduction to our chaotic 'scheme' of benefits see J.C.
Brown, A Hit-and-Miss Affair: Policies for Disabled People in
Canada. Ottawa: Canadian Council for Social Development,
1977.
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social security abuse. A thoughtful economist has writ-
ten, "By definition, its extent is not known, and in truth,
is not open even to reliable estimation."'
Instead of comparing the extent of abuse, one
might compare other aspects of abuse, for example the
sanctions administered for tax evasion and social
security fraud. But, even here, difficulties abound. For
one thing, it is not enough to count the number of pro-
secutions in the field of tax evasion and compare it with
the number of prosecutions in the field of social securi-
ty. In social security the usual sanction applied to some-
one wrongfully claiming benefit is to deny the benefit.'
Yet the denial of benefit to a claimant may be more
severe financially than a fine or a prison sentence. Even
if social security decisions were published - and for the
most part they are not9 - there would still be no way of
telling how many people who rightfully claim welfare
benefits are not given them.
With the understanding that my remarks are sub-
ject to these reservations, I shall try to demonstrate that
there is very little abuse in the social security field and
that, indeed, the major problem in the area of social
security is that people are denied benefits either in viola-
tion of legal principles or on the basis of criteria that are
not made public.' 0 In contrast, I feel that the public
purse suffers great losses in the field of tax evasion. I
think that we could (and should) be more energetic and
imaginative in preventing tax abuse and that, generally,
a double standard pervades our attitudes towards, and
perception of, tax and social security abuses.
Part I - Social Security Abuse
In order to illustrate these points, I shall first ex-
amine three areas of social security: workers' compensa-
tion, unemployment insurance and welfare. I shall then
deal with tax evasion.
Workers' Compensation
It is doubtful whether any subject of Canadian
public policy has been more fully examined than
workers' compensation. In Ontario alone, there have
been three Royal Commission Reports," one Task
Force Inquiryl 2 and a review by a group of pension con-
sultants.13 In no single review of the provincial Acts that
I am aware of has the problem of false claims been men-
tioned as being of any significance.
I think that the reason why there is so little abuse in
workers' compensation is that it is very difficult to feign
injury and it is very difficult to pass off an injury
that occurred, say, at home as being one that occurred
at work.14 Very occasionally, perhaps, a claimant is able
to persuade a board that a non-work-caused injury oc-
curred at work,'I but - and this illustrates my point
about the difficulty of defining at least serious abuse -
in the very rare case where a claimant is able to obtain
workers' compensation benefits for an accident that oc-
curred outside the factory gate, I am afraid that I am
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unable to feel any great sense of outrage. For the pur-
pose of a national social security scheme, it is impossible
to justify, either on policy grounds or in terms of ethics,
discrimination between those persons who suffer in-
juries at the work place and those who suffer them
elsewhere.
However, even accepting a distinction between
work- and non-work-related injuries, it is distressing to
find that most workers' compensation boards 6 do not
attempt to lay down criteria for determining whether an
accident arises out of and in the course of employment.
Consider, for example, the four following Ontario
7. See Christopher, "Tax Avoidance", supra note 2, pp. 79, 89.
8. Thus, in the United Kingdom in 1974, 2335 cases were in-
vestigated for fictitious desertion and 9,993 cases for undisclosed
cohabitation. The investigations resulted in 45 per cent and 41
per cent respectively of allowances being reduced or withdrawn
for each group of claimants who were investigated; see figures
cited in F. Field et al., supra note 1, p. 153.
9. Even those decisions which are reported are so inadequate that
the claimant cannot make any kind of intelligent decision as to
whether he or she wants to appeal. The point has been well put
by Professor Ison when commenting on decisions of the Ontario
Workmen's Compensation Board. Ison says of these decisions,
"They are simply a brief recital of some of the evidence followed
by a decree. They do not state what principles are being applied,
or how these principles are derived nor do they portray in any
other way any movement of the mind from premises to conclu-
sion". See his paper, "Contemporary Developments and Reform
in Personal Injury Compensation," in New Developments in the
Law of Torts, Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures.
Toronto: Richard De Boo, 1973, pp. 521,547. The decisions of
the Ontario Social Assistance Review Board are at least as bad as
those of the Ontario Workmen's Compensation Board.
10. We have no Canadian estimates as to how many Canadians who
are entitled to welfare benefits do not obtain them. In the United
Kingdom, Professor David Donnison, Chairman of the Sup-
plementary Benefits Commission, has estimated that 25 per cent
of those who are entitled to welfare benefits do not obtain them;
see his speech, "Policies and Priorities for Supplementary
Benefits," given to the London Branch of the British Institute of
Management on November 16, 1976 at p. 11.
11. See the reports by Mr. Justice Middleton (1932), Mr. Justice
Roach (1950), and Mr. Justice MacGillivray (1967).
12. Ont., Task Force Workmen's Compensation Board, The Ad-
ministration of Workmen's Compensation in Ontario. Toronto,
1973.
13. See The Wyatt Report on Workmen's Compensation (1978); for
a critique of the Report see Hasson, "The Wyatt Report on
Workmen's Compensation - A Nightmare," 1 Low Income Law
(No. 3) 18 (1980).
14. Even the most liberal workers' compensation board in the coun-
try has set out fairly stringent criteria for determining whether
accidents are work-related or not. See, for example, decision No.
145 of the British Columbia Workers' Compensation Board
dated October 3, 1975.
15. See, for example, the tragic case reported in The Globe and Mail
on April 17, 1980. A Hamilton man was convicted of defrauding
the Workmen's Compensation Board of $7,344.40. The accused
was sentenced to a five month jail term. The claimant had lost
the sight in one eye in a 1973 car accident. He did not obtain
compensation in respect of that accident. In 1974, he suffered an
accident at work which he claimed had caused him to lose the
sight in his eye. The claimant obtained benefits from the Board
for twenty-one months before the true facts were discovered.
Under a rational compensation scheme, such cases simply could
not occur.
16. The only exception to this statement appears to be the British
Columbia Worker's Compensation Board.
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cases.II In the first case, a wood lathe operator injured
his hand while turning a piece of wood for his personal
use. In the second case, an employee injured his eye
while lighting a cigarette while on his way to the
washroom. In both these cases, the Board held that
under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act
the claimant was not entitled to receive protection for
personal acts.
These cases should be contrasted with the case of
the employee who suffered a lumbar strain when pick-
ing up a can of cola from a dispensing machine located
in the canteen. In another case, an employee was injured
as she was re-entering the factory gates after returning
from a dental appointment. In both these latter cases,
the employees where held to be entitled to compensation
because they were acting within the scope of their
employment.
It seems to me that the theory which allowed the
claimants in the last two cases to recover - that is, that
The task of comparing welfare abuse
with tax evasion is a challenging one
fraught with formidable difficulties.
an accident which occurs on the employer's premises is
one that arises out of and in the course of employment
- should have been applied to allow recovery in the
first two cases.
Even more disturbing than the frolics of the boards
with regard to the "scope of employment" doctrine is the
extremely harsh attitude taken by the boards towards
compensation for industrial diseases.'" "Accidents,
poisonings and violence" accounted for only 24.4 per
cent of the deaths of people aged between 20-60 in 1974.
Disease accounted for 75.6 per cent of the deaths.' 9
However, when workers' compensation figures for the
Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba Boards are ex-
amined, only between 2 per cent and 17 per cent of
awards were made in respect of death from disease. 20 Of
the total number of permanent disability awards only
3.4 per cent to 11.3 per cent are awarded in respect of
disease, and of these, the majority are for hearing loss.
If claims for hearing loss are excluded, only 0.8 per cent
to 1.7 per cent of the total number of permanent
disability awards are for disease. 2 1 Workers might be
excused for thinking that the Workmen's Compensation
Act should be renamed the Workers' Compensation
(Trauma) Act.
In recent years some commentators have focused
their attention on what they perceive to be an abuse in
the system of workers' compensation. That abuse may
be described as the problem of overlapping benefits or
overcompensation of workers. Thus, in December 1979,
the Ontario Workmen's Compensation Board pointed
out in its Grey Paper 2 2 that as a result of some workers
obtaining Canada Pension Plan benefits, disability in-
surance and wage loss plans, in addition to their
workers' compensation benefits, some workers might be
financially better off while injured than while working.
Yet although this is true for a small percentage of
workers, any 'overcompensation' is not likely to last
long: workers' compensation benefits and other col-
lateral benefits are not usually inflation-proof. If the
ceilings on workers' compensation benefits were to be
removed and a system of inflation-proofing of benefits
were to be introduced, then it might make sense to speak
of over-compensation as being a problem. 23  At pre-
sent, however, the problem is one of under-, rather than
over-compensation.
I cannot leave the subject of overcompensation
without mentioning that, in the field of personal injury
litigation, overcompensation of accident victims is
generally regarded with equanimity and sometimes with
positive enthusiasm. Not only are accident victims
awarded substantial sums for pain and suffering, 24 but
accident victims are not required to deduct from their
awards either private insurance benefits,2 ' Canada Pen-
sion Plan benefits, 26 wage payments by the employer 27
or any other collateral benefit. 28 Any attempt to change
the collateral benefits principle in this area would pro-
voke the wrath of most lawyers. Ironically, most of
these lawyers applaud the principle that there should be
no overlapping benefits in workers' compensation cases.
Unemployment Insurance
There is some evidence that a great many Cana-
dians believe that the Unemployment Insurance Act is
17. These examples are taken from the paper "Workmen's Compen-
sation in Ontario", given by Mr. G.W.T. Reed, Q.C., Vice-
Chairman of Appeals of the Ontario Workmen's Compensation
Board, in Employment Law, Law Sociey of Upper Canada,
Special Lectures. Toronto: Richard De Boo, 1976. pp. 110-12.
18. For a comprehensive discussion of the problem of compensating
for industrial diseases, see T. Ison, The Dimensions of Industrial
Disease. Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's Univers-
ity, 1978.
19. Statistics Canada 1974, Causes of Death.
20. See Ison supra note 18, p. 1.
21. Id.
22. See Ontario Workmen's Compensation Board, Current Con-
cerns in Workmen's Compensation. Mimeo, December, 1979.
23. Even in provinces such as British Columbia where worker's com-
pensation benefits are inflation-proof, private insurance disabili-
ty benefits are not inflation-proof.
24. See the award of $100,000 for pain and suffering and loss of
amenities awarded by the Supreme Court of Canada in Andrews
v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd. (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 452, 491. It
would be fair to say that this sum is regarded as being extremely
(or excessively) moderate by commentators and practitioners.
25. See e.g., Parry v. Cleaver, [1970] A.C. I (H.L.).
26. See e.g., Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Gill(1973), 37 D.L.R. (3d) 229
(S.C.C.).
27. See e.g., Harris v. Manchester (1975), 50 D.L.R. (3d) 90 (Man.
Q.B.).
28. The one exception to this principle is to be found in the various
provincial no-fault road accident benefits; see, for example, The
Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224.
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being abused by claimants. Thus a review sponsored by
the Unemployment Insurance Commission in 1977
found that "71 per cent of Canadians felt that the U.I.
program should be tightened." 2 9 In February 1978, the
Toronto Globe and Mail reported that 84 per cent of
Canadians thought that the Act needed to be tightened
up to prevent abuse.3 0 In my view, the Act does not
need tightening up, because it is being administered in a
very unsympathetic manner. It is necessary to divide the
areas of alleged abuse into separate categories.
Unemployment Insurance Fraud. Penalties may
be imposed either under section 47 or under section 121
of the Act upon someone who falsely claims benefits
and upon people who make false statements. Section 47
imposes administrative penalties whereas section 121
imposes criminal penalties." The figures for the
number of penalties imposed in recent years are as
follows: 32
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
No. of
Claims
1,974,000
2,438,000
2,429,000
2,500,000
2,809,000
No. of
s.47 Penalties
22,474
26,853
38,151
60,000
50,000
No. of
s.121 Penalties
924
1,800
4,660
6,500
6,700
The total number of claimants subject to either penalty
or prosecution rose from 1.19 per cent in 1974 to 2.66
per cent in 1977. In 1978 this figure dropped to 2.01 per
cent, but it seems clear that the last four years have seen
stricter control over claimants.
The annual reports of the Unemployment In-
surance Commission do not give any breakdown of how
many of these convictions and penalties are imposed for
failure to disclose earnings as opposed to, say, incor-
rectly stating the number of jobs searched for or merely
making false statements. The British Royal Committee
on the Abuse of Social Security Benefits found that 86
per cent of the prosecutions were for the failure to
report the receipt of earnings above that permitted.33 I
am prepared to assume that most prosecutions in
Canada are, similarly, for failure to report outside earn-
ings.
In assessing the moral culpability and therefore the
seriousness of the abuse committed by claimants who
fail to report outside earnings, I would like to make a
plea in mitigation and urge that the law be changed. As
the law stands at present, a claimant is entitled to earn a
sum equal to 25 per cent of his or her weekly benefits.3 4
However, for every $1 earned above that amount, his or
her benfits are reduced by $1. This means that earnings
in excess of 25 per cent are taxed at a rate of 100 per
cent. If, as has been argued for so long, penal rates of
taxation encourage tax evasion,35 then surely we ought
to be concerned about a system that imposes a rate of
taxation that is without parallel in the field of income
taxation.
In considering the amount and seriousness of
abuse, as it is reflected by the numbers of prosecutions,
one must also consider that included in these statistics
are a number of cases in which claimants are prosecuted
for making a false statement even though the govern-
ment suffers no financial loss. The kind of cases that
give me particular concern are those of the employees
who report themselves as being unemployed when they
are sick. In such a case, claimants have undoubtedly
committed an offence by making a false statement but
the government has suffered no financial loss since
employees are entitled to sickness benefit in any event. 6
What is the point in bringing such prosecutions? The
federal government has spent vast amounts of money
telling us that unemployment insurance fraud is a
serious problem. 7 If it used some of this money to
advertise the fact that sickness and pregnancy benefits
are available under the Act, then such cases might not
arise.
The Problem of the Workshy. The problem of the
workshy unemployment insurance claimant is one that
has received extensive attention from the politicians and
from the mass media. The difficulty, however, is that
like 'abuse', 'workshyness' is a very subjective concept.
Thus, individuals who refuse a lower-paid and less
prestigious job would not regard themselves as being
workshy; but the Commission might take precisely that
view and disqualify (and/or disentitle) them. The
Unemployment Insurance Act, subsection 40(3), re-
quires a claimant after a "reasonable interval" to lower
his or her sights in terms of the jobs that she or he is
willing to accept. The problem, however, is that the
claimants do not know what constitutes a "reasonable
interval" and by how much their expectations must be
lowered. According to the authors of a study prepared
for the Law Reform Commission, Unemployment In-
surance Benefits, claimants in the first three weeks of
29. Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, Com-
prehensive Review of the U.I. Program in Canada, pp. 1-4,
quoted in E. Rosen, A Report on the Comprehensive Review of
the Unemployment Insurance Program in Canada. Ottawa: Ad-
visory Council on the Status of Women, 1977.
30. See the figures quoted in a letter to the editor by Mr. L.E. St.
Laurent, Executive Director, Benefits, Canada Employment
Commission, Globe and Mail, February 28, 1978.
31. A section 47 penalty is imposed when there are felt to be
"mitigating or extenuating circumstances," whereas a criminal
penalty is imposed when there are felt to be no such cir-
cumstances. For a partial list of these 'extenuating' cir-
cumstances, see P. Issalys and G. Watkins, Unemployment In-
surance Benefits, a study prepared for the Law Reform Commis-
sion of Canada. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1977.
32. See the Annual Reports of the Unemployment Insurance Com-
mission, 1974-79.
33. See Report, supra note 4, p. 227, para. 492.
34. See s. 26(2), Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, S.C.
1970-71-72, c. 48.
35. The argument that "penal" rates of taxation encourage evasion
was advanced as early as 1922; see e.g., Bastable, Public Finance
310 (3d ed., 1922) quoted in Blum & Kalven, "The Uneasy Case
for Progressive Taxation," 19 U. Chicago L. Rev. 417, 444, n. 80
(1952).
36. See, e.g., CUB 3123 (December 23, 1971).
37. See the statement by the Hon. Bud Cullen, then Minister of
Employment and Immigration, in Can., H. of C. Deb., January
23, 1978, p. 2301.
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unemployment are entitled to regard as suitable only
such jobs as are in their own occupation and which pay
their normal rate of earnings. After this period, skilled
[Glenerally, a double standard per-
vades our attitudes towards, and
perception of, tax and social security
abuses.
workers with more than one year's experience in their
occupation receive an extension of one week for every
year of experience, up to a maximum of thirteen weeks.
At the end of this time, claimants must expand the scope
of their search to include other occupations, at a pro-
gressively lower rate of earnings in relation to their
previous earnings (five per cent less per week). An
employee is not, however, required to accept a job if the
rate of pay is lower than the prevailing wage for the par-
ticular occupation or if the conditions of employment
are less favourable than those observed by collective
agreements or recognized by good employers. 38
It is scandalous that this rule is unpublished, but
even more shocking is the fact that the Commission "has
instructed its Agents not to inform claimants to be par-
ticularly demanding in terms of a new job until the lapse
of the 'reasonable interval'. If the claimant questions the
Agent regarding the length of the interval he is told
simply that it depends on the type of employment, the
experience of the claimant in his occupation and the
length of time on unemployment. No specific time limit
is mentioned.""
If such a practice existed in the field of taxation
law, there would (rightly) be outcries invoking the prin-
ciple of the rule of law. Strangely, however, we seem to
accept this bizarre denial of the principle in unemploy-
ment insurance.
I should also mention, in discussing workshyness,
the peculiar view taken by the Commission, and sup-
ported by the jurisprudence, that an employee may be
deemed to have refused employment even if the
employee is unable to commute to the job. The Com-
mission has taken the view that transportation ar-
rangements are the concern solely of the employee. 40
I cannot leave the problem of workshyness without
referring to the guide issued to benefit control officers.
This guide includes the following statements:
5. Tell the truth. A bluff may occasionally be justified;
deliberate falsehoods, never.
6. Do not underestimate the mental capacity and ability of
your subject.
11. Be dominant without being domineering.4'
In my view, such instructions could not be justified in a
police training manual. 42 They are even more inap-
propriate in a scheme where the emphasis shoujd be on
giving assistance to people who are in a difficult posi-
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tion, usually through no fault of their own. Statements
such as the ones I have quoted can only tend to produce
harsh and unsympathetic treatment for claimants.
The Problem of Overpayments. In recent months,
public attention has again focused on the problem of
overpayments in unemployment insurance. It will be
remembered that as a result of a computer error, over-
payments amounting to $4.3 million were made recently
to claimants in Nova Scotia, Quebec and British Colum-
bia. 43 But in no case of overpayment that I know of has
it been shown that the recipients were acting other
than in good faith. Despite this fact, the reporting of
overpayment cases by the press does not make this clear
and there is a strong suggestion, which is picked up by
many readers, that the benefits were not received in
good faith. The Commission also seems to take the view
that these receipts of benefit constitute a serious form of
abuse, to judge from the aggressive measures it has
taken, in many cases, to recover these overpayments.
By contrast in the area of private insurance, the
courts have allowed insured persons to recover on their
policies by rectifying an incorrect answer given by the
insured in the proposal form. 4 4 Further, the courts have
held, in the case of group insurance, that an employee's
dependents' rights cannot be extinguished by a
misrepresentation made by an employer. 45 If privately
insured people are entitled to recover even where, on a
strict reading of the policy, they are not entitled to do
so, and even though they are responsible for the errors
which might be thought to have extinguished their
rights, it is difficult to see why unemployment insurance
recipients should be treated differently.
In short, I think there is very little evidence of
abuse in the field of unemployment insurance. To the
extent that there is abuse, this might be reduced by tax-
ing casual earnings above the permitted amount at a
more reasonable rate. The more serious abuses, to my
mind, are perpetrated by officials. In a number of cases
prosecutions are needlessly brought. 4 6 Further, an
employee may be disqualified or disentitled because of
secret rules which the Commission resolutely refuses to
make public. 47 Also, benefit control officers are trained
to take a hostile and adversarial position towards their
38. See s. 40(2), Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.
39. See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Unemployment In-
surance Benefits, supra note 31, pp. 54-55.
40. See, e.g., CUB 2599 (May 12, 1966).
41. Quoted in Law Reform Commission of Canada Unemployment
Insurance Benefits, supra note 31, p. 83.
42. If such instructions were included in a police training manual,
one would hope that bodies such as the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association would be exercised and outraged.
43. See 1 Low Income Law (No. 2) 16 (1979).
44. See Leepo Machine Products Ltd. v. Western Assurance Ltd.,
[1973] S.C.R. 171.
45. Bohl v. Great-West Life Assurance Co. (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d)
584 (Sask. C.A.).
46. See note 36, supra.
47. See text at note 39, supra.
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claimants.48 Finally, claimants who have received over-
payments in good faith are generally required to make
restitution and the Commission's claims against these
unfortunate people are pursued in a manner that would
do credit to a hardened debt-collector.
Welfare Abuse
Although we do not know whether a great percen-
tage of Canadians believe that claimants are abusing the
welfare system, 49 it would not be surprising if welfare
fraud provoked more anger than unemployment in-
surance abuse. First of all, I think our society is
prepared to be a little more charitable towards those
people who have purchased some degree of protection
with their premiums. The welfare defrauder, on the
other hand, is seen as not having paid anything for his
or her protection; he or she is therefore regarded as an
undeserving recipient of charity.10 Second, we seem able
to identify a little more readily with the unemployed
("there but for the grace of God go I") than with people
who have received an even more cruel buffeting from
fate.
I propose to discuss the problems of welfare abuse
under various headings.
Welfare Fraud. We have no figures for the number
of people who are prosecuted for welfare fraud. Nor do
we know for what kinds of fraud such persons are pro-
secuted. According to the British Report of the Com-
mittee on Abuse of Social Security benefits, 74 per cent
of those convicted for welfare fraud were convicted for
failure to report outside earnings." One would have
thought that the figures might be comparable in
Canada, but the Ontario figures under the Family
Benefits Act for 1977-78 show a striking difference. In
that year, 14.3 per cent of cases 'actively reviewed' were
in respect of 'income and entitlement' requirements and
3.7 per cent of cases 'actively reviewed' were in respect
of mothers who had worked more hours than allowed. 5 2
These figures might be different for other provinces
and, indeed, they might be different for Ontario in
other years. In any event, whatever the figures for the
number of people who are prosecuted for failure to
declare outside earnings, I think that - as in the case of
unemployment insurance - we encourage welfare fraud
by taxing outside earnings (with the exception of a very
low amount)53 at a rate of 100 per cent. 54
In most cases of welfare fraud, I find it difficult to
feel any outrage because of the scandalously low level of
welfare benefits. There is some evidence that some
courts share - at least in part - my view. Thus, in
Simm, decided by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in
September 1975,"1 a mother claimed in respect of two
children when she had only one. She was ordered to
make full restitution but a three month prison sentence
was reduced to a suspended sentence. In Said, a case
decided by the Manitoba Provincial Court in 1979,16 the
accused failed to report a common law spouse and one
year's employment. As a result, she had received
$14,000 over 4 2 years. Upon conviction she was placed
CANADIAN TAXATION/SUMMER, 1980
on one year's probation and was not required to make
any restitution."
It is not only the fact that welfare benefits are scan-
dalously low that influences my thinking on this issue. I
am also influenced by the fact that in many, if not most,
cases the people who commit welfare fraud are fre-
quently in dire financial and emotional straits. In this
connection, I would like to cite a paragraph from the
evidence of the Family Service Units to the British Com-
mittee on the Abuse of Social Security Benefits:
48. See text at note 42, supra. It should also be noted that a high
percentage of benefit control officers are recruited by the Comis-
sion from the ranks of former policemen, private detectives and
investigators for commercial collection agencies. As was pointed
out in a study prepared for the Law Reform Commission of
Canada, Unemployment Insurance Benefits supra note 31, p. 75:
... these hiring practices may create a risk that benefit con-
trol operations be occasionally tainted with the ethics and the
(sometimes strongly criticized) methods of private agencies.
49. See text at note 30, supra.
50. Not only does society see welfare as charity but there is also
evidence that welfare recipients see themselves as recipients of
charity; see the surveys by Briar, "Welfare from Below: Reci-
pients' Views of the Public Welfare System," 54 California L.
Rev. 370 (1966) and by Handler & Hollingsworth, "Stigma,
Privacy and Other Attitudes of Welfare Recipients," 22 Stanford
L. Rev. 1 (1969).
51. See Report, supra note 4, p. 227, para. 492.
52. Information supplied by Mr. D. Alfieri, Director, Income
Maintenance Branch, Ministry of Community and Social Ser-
vices of Ontario, February 26, 1980.
53. The provisions on outside earnings which the claimant is allowed
to keep are fiendishly difficult to understand; see the General
Welfare Assistance Act Regulations, R.R.O. 383, s. 12, and the
Family Benefits Act Regulations, R.R.O., 287, s. 12.
54. The position of the welfare claimant is worse than that of the
unemployment insurance claimant on at least two other grounds.
The welfare claimant will be penalized for having 'excessive'
assets; see General Welfare Assistance Act Regulations, R.R.O.
383, s. 1(1) (i), and the Family Benefits Act Regulations, R.R.O.
287, s. 8. Second, the welfare claimant (unlike the recipient of
unemployment insurance) will be penalised for 'improvident'
disposition of his or her assets before claiming welfare; see
General Welfare Assistance Act, R.R.O. 383, s. 4; see the Family
Benefits Act, R.R.O. 287, s. 8.
55. See 1 Low Income Law (No. 3) 6 (1980). Compare, however the
case of Ashdown, decided by the same Court of Appeal in 1979.
In the latter case, the accused had obtained $2,400 fraudulently.
Despite the fact that she was a first offender, and had two
children and was six months pregnant, whe was sentenced to a
six month jail sentence and ordered to make full restitution.
56. 1 Low Income Law (No. 3) 6 (1980). Compare, however, the
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Thurrolt (1971),
5 C.C.C. (2d) 129. The accused had obtained $1,700 fraudulent-
ly. Despite the fact that she had four children, she received a five
month jail sentence.
57. In many cases the court has emphasized that the principal factor
influencing its sentencing decisions is the factor of deterrence.
Thus in Thurrolt, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated:
Although the case is pitiful in many respects, this Court is
unanimously of the opinion that the paramount considera-
tion in determining the sentence is the element of deter-
rence.
Id., p. 129. See also the decision in R. v. Leveillee (unrep., On-
tario Court of Appeal, 1973) where again the dominant factor in
welfare fraud cases was stated to be the factor of 'deterrence'.
Once 'deterrence' is said to be the key factor in sentencing, it is
virtually certain that a custodial sentence will be imposed,
whether this makes any sense is doubtful.
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All the cases of abuse described by FSU workers occurred
in families living for long periods on extremely low in-
comes, one third in single parent families with the addi-
tional stresses experienced. The vast majority were, in the
opinion of the workers not 'rogues' wilfully abusing social
security, but ordinary claimants either unknowingly or in
desperation making wrongful claims in order to ease
unbearable situations, created in the main by the vicious
circle of long-term poverty, and in some instances by per-
sonal problems including psychiatric ill health."
Similarly, the Edinburgh Council on Social Service
told the same Committee:
In general, we feel that the majority of people who resort to
such devices to defraud the (Supplementary Benefits) Com-
mission do so out of the necessity to obtain an income at
subsistence level rather than from irresponsible choice.,,
Welfare Abuse - Who's Abusing Whom? One of
the critical problems in welfare law is to try to ascertain
whether the correct legal principles are being applied. If
we are deprived of this information, as we frequently
are, it becomes impossible to determine whether the
claimant is abusing the welfare system or is being abus-
ed by it. The difficulty is that the decisions of social
welfare agencies - even when published - are often
impossible to divine. The point can be made by looking
at the application of the cohabitation rule since the
critically important decision of the Ontario Divisional
Court in Re Proc.6 0 In that case, the Divisional Court
stated that realistic criteria must be applied in determin-
ing whether the claimant is cohabiting so as to deprive
her of welfare benefits. Since that decision was handed
down, Professor R.W. Kerr of the University of Wind-
sor Law School has examined forty-two decisions of the
[T]here is very little evidence of abuse
in the field of unemployment in-
surance.
Social Assistance Review Board on the cohabitation
rule. 6 1 From his survey, Professor Kerr concludes that it
is impossible to tell whether the principles in Re Proc are
being applied or not. 6 2 A recent Ontario Court of Ap-
peal decision suggests that the welfare authorities are
continuing to act as if the Proc case had never been
decided .6
The cohabitation cases are of special importance
because it seems that in Ontario, at least, most welfare
fraud prosecutions are brought against claimants who
are "not living as single persons." Thus in 1977-78, 63.5
per cent of cases 'actively reviewed' involved claimants
not living as single persons. 64
The cohabitation cases constitute only one example
of the welfare tribunals' failure to spell out any general
principles. Thus, in determining whether there is a need
for a "special allowance," the welfare tribunals have
concluded that a welfare claimant is not entitled to a
"special allowance" to enable her to bear the expense of
obtaining a divorce.6 1 Similarly, a claimant is not entitl-
ed to a "special allowance" in order to declare bankrupt-
cy. 6 6 However, a deserted wife may be able to claim for
the cost of completing her degree in chemistry at the
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University of Saskatchewan.67 If we were in the green
fields of taxation law, there would be interpretation
bulletins to cover these and similar cases, but in the
wilderness of welfare law claimants and their legal ad-
visers are required to engage in a bizarre roulette game.
To take one final example of welfare law where
there appear to be no signposts, consider the interpreta-
tion of the "disabled" person's allowance in the provin-
cial welfare statutes. Under the provincial welfare
statutes a claimant is entitled to a special allowance if he
or she can show that he or she is disabled.68 Unfor-
tunately, the case law on the meaning of "disabled" is
impossible to decode; it might be read as suggesting that
a claimant is disabled if he or she needs constant care
and attention but there is no tribunal decision of which I
am aware, that states that this is the test. 69
The Welfare Claimant's Right to Appeal. One
might be forgiven for assuming that in a civilized system
of jurisprudence, aggrieved persons should know of
their right to appeal, but a survey by the Canadian Civil
Liberties Association revealed that approximately half
of the welfare claimants who had been denied welfare
benefits did not know that they had a right of appeal.
The number of persons in various cities who did not
know that they had a right to appeal an adverse welfare
decision are as follows: 0
58. See Report, supra note 4, p. 168, para. 367.
59. Id.
60. (1974), 53 D.L.R. (3d) 513. The Ontario Court of Appeal
dismissed the appeal of the Minister without written or recorded
reasons on April 1, 1975; see Comment, "Proc in the Ontario
Court of Appeal," 4 Bull. Canadian Welfare Law (No. 1) 44
(1976).
61. See his article, "Living Together as Husband and Wife: The Cur-
rent Approach to the 'Man in the House' Rule under Ontario's
Welfare Law," 1 Low Income Law (No.1) 29 (1979).
62. Professor Kerr concludes that the "decisions of the Ontario
Assistance Review Board evidence little appreciation of the
Court's direction (in Proc's) case to apply an economic test, and
leave room to suspect a continued application of moral stan-
dards." id., p. 34.
63. See Re Warwick and the Minister of Community and Social Ser-
vices (1978), 91 D.L.R. (3d) 131.
64. See information supplied by Mr. D. Alfieri, Director, Income
Maintenance Branch, Ministry of Community and Social Ser-
vices of Ontario, February 26, 1980.
65. See Re Wasylow, 1 Bull. Canadian Welfare Law (No.2) 31
(1972).
66. See Re Special Allowance for Bankruptcy Fees, 2(1) Bull. Cana-
dian Welfare L. 33 (No. 1) (1973). See also Le Blanc v. City of
Transcona (1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 549 (S.C.C.).
67. See Re Noble, 2 Bull. Canadian Welfare Law (No.2) 44 (1973).
68. See Family Benefits Act Regulations, R.R.O. 287, ss. 1(3)(b),
25(a).
69. Because the test is an extremely stringent one, numerous
claimants with severe disabilities bring claims only to be told that
they do not qualify for the "disability" benefit. In fact, I have not
been able to find a single reported case where someone has been
entitled to a "disability" benefit.
70. See Welfare Practices and Civil Liberties: A Canadian Survey.
Toronto: Canadian Civil Liberties Education Trust, 1975, p. 81.
The United Kingdom Committee on Welfare Abuse supra note
4, found that most welfare recipients did not know of their right
to appeal an unfavourable welfare decision; see the Report, p.
173, para. 381.
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Did not know of their right to appeal
an unfavourable welfare decision
Toronto
Hamilton
Halifax
Fredericton
Winnipeg
Regina
206
39
57
69
28
22
or 560o6
or 45%
or 44%
or 750o%
or 280%o
or 43%
of a sample
of a sample
of a sample
of a sample
of a sample
of a sample
of 366
of 87
of 130
of 92
of 99
of 51
It is inconceivable that anything remotely ap-
proaching this number of taxpayers are ignorant of their
right to appeal adverse tax rules or criminal convictions
for tax evasion. Further, the taxpayer with problems
frequently has the means to obtain very good counsel,
whereas it is probable that the welfare defrauder will
often get only summary justice.7'
The Welfare Claimant and the Right of Search.
Complaints are sometimes made about the extensive
powers that are available to Revenue officers. 72
However, these powers pale when set alongside the
powers of search that exist in welfare cases. For exam-
ple, section 7 of the Ontario General Welfare Assistance
Act provides that:
In determining the eligibility of an applicant . . .a welfare
administrator shall make or cause to be made a visit to the
home of the applicant for the purpose of enquiring into the
living conditions and financial and other circumstances of
the applicant. . .3
This section leaves all sorts of questions unanswered.
For one, does this periodic review include subsequent
visits to the recipient's home? How extensive or restric-
tive are the powers of inspection on such occasions? Do
these powers have any limits?
In a great number of cases, no appointment is made
by the welfare department before they make their sear-
ches. The figures found by the Canadian Civil Liberties
Education Trust were as follows: 7 4
No notice given of visit
Toronto
Hamilton
Halifax
Winnipeg
Fredericton
164 or 49% of a sample of 330
30 or 36% of a sample of 83
54 or 55% of a sample of 99
23 or 23% of a sample of 102
42 or 69% of a sample of 61
Welfare workers are prepared to concede that there are
times when recipients expressly objected to their visits.
One welfare worker, for example, recalled a situation
when his visit coincided with the visit of the recipient's
friends. The recipient took exception to the worker's be-
ing there because he did not want his friends to know
that he was on welfare. 5
It is not difficult to imagine the outcry that would
arise from taxpayers and from the legal profession if
such wide-ranging powers existed to control tax
avoidance and evasion.
The Welfare Claimant and Abuse. I want, finally,
to deal with the degrading remarks made to welfare
claimants. In their survey of 427 welfare recipients, the
Canadian Civil Liberties Education Trust found that 96
or 23 per cent complained of "rude and degrading"
treatment by the department. For example, in Win-
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nipeg, a 46 year old divorced woman, suffering from ar-
thritis and varicose veins, reported that, upon refusing
her choice of a main floor apartment, the welfare
worker said "We can carry you on our backs, ha-ha." In
Regina, when a crib was requested for a newly born
child, the welfare official is reported to have advised the
family to use a cardboard box. Finally, in Toronto, a
25-year old separated woman said that her worker gave
her the following advice, "You've got an arse, go out to
hustle to make money, other women do,"7 6 Such
behaviour is morally outrageous; certainly taxpayers are
not subjected to it, even if they are delinquent and have
[A]s in the case of unemployment in-
surance - we encourage welfare fraud
by taxing outside earnings ... at a rate
of 100 per cent.
been found guilty of tax evasion. In addition to being
morally indefensible, it seems to me that such conduct is
imprudent. People who are treated in such a manner are
unlikely to have much respect for the law. Breaking the
law may, with considerable justification, come to be
seen as necessary self-defence in a war with a hostile
welfare bureaucracy.
My conclusion is that welfare claimants are more
abused than abusing. I do not know of any branch of
law which provides as little guidance for its claimants.
Further, I believe that the amount of money lost through
welfare fraud is very little. I think that we should con-
centrate our energies on making sure that as few people
as possible are on welfare." In respect of those people
who must depend on welfare (for example those who
have never been able to enter the job market) we should
provide a guaranteed annual income that does not re-
quire them to live in penury. I think, moreover, that'we
should learn to treat welfare recipients with courtesy
and that we should accord them the same rights of due
process and legal representation which we presently ac-
cord to the wealthy.
71. See Aikman and Berger, "Prosecution of Welfare Fraud in Cook
County: the Anatomy of a Legal System," 45 J. Urban L. 287
(1967); Evans, "Defense in Welfare Fraud," 5 San Diego L. Rev.
83 (1968). For a vivid account of the system of summary criminal
justice which obtains in the United Kingdom 'cohabitation'
cases, see Ruth Lister's monograph, As Man and Wife? London
Child Poverty Action Group, 1973.
72. See, e.g., Potvin, "Tax Evasion in Canada," 25 Canadian Tax J.
229 (1977).
73. See General Welfare Assistance Act Regulations, R.R.O. 383, s.
7.
74. See Welfare Practices and Civil Liberties - A Canadian Survey,
supra note 70, p. 36.
75. Id., p. 37.
76. Id., p. 77.
77. For a start, we could have a universal accident and sickness com-
pensation scheme. In the second place, we could ensure adequate
retirement pensions for the elderly. Finally we could have a
serious job creation program. I think that once we had achieved
these aims, the number of people we would have take care of
would not be large.
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PART II Tax Evasion
Frustrating though it is to seek meaningful infor-
mation on welfare abuse, it is even more difficult to ob-
tain meaningful information on tax evasion. Welfare
abuse has been seen as being a serious enough problem
to warrant some study. There is, after all, the Report of
a prestigious British Committee on the subject,'7 pro-
vincial reports on workers' compensation, 7 9 and several
reports on unemployed persons. 0 In the field of tax
evasion, writing seems to be largely limited to problems
of procedure."1
This is startling since the estimates of the amount
of revenue lost through tax evasion are enormous.8 2
Thus, Mr. Anthony Christopher of the U.K. Inland
Staff Federation estimated in March 1979 that the
amount lost through tax evasion by the self-employed
alone exceeded £200 million in a year. More recently,
according to Sir William Pile, Chairman of the Board of
Inland Revenue, "it is not implausible" that earnings
which evade tax might be as much as E10 billion a year.
If that sum were subject to tax it would yield revenue
totalling 3-4 billion a year.8" In Canada, Mr. James
Gourlay of Revenue Canada has estimated that the
amount lost through tax evasion in Canada exceeds $3
billion a year.8 4
If tax evasion is as serious a problem as these
figures indicate, the question arises as to why we know
so little about it. I think that one reason why tax evasion
excites so little outcry and passion is that it is so per-
vasive. As Edmond Cahn wrote in his book, The Moral
Decision:
In small, medium and large amounts at each passing hour this
kind of chicane is practised by citizens of all ranks and of every
level of repute."
I believe that tax evasion is pervasive because first,
even rich taxpayers are able to rationalize their tax eva-
sions to themselves. After all, the loss of revenue caused
by one person's evasion of tax is so minute that it is im-
possible to measure in any system of accounts. 6 Se-
cond, I think that tax evasion is pervasive because it has
become known that the number of audits carried out is
extremely small; 8 7 this means that the tax evader's
chances of being caught are remote. Third, tax evasion
is legitimized by the fact that we condone tax avoidance.
Moreover, we define tax avoidance extremely broadly.
This also encourages tax evasion. In this light, one
might consider the following examples which were cited
by Mr. W.Z. Estey, Q.C. (as he then was) of the dif-
ficulty in drawing the line between tax avoidance and
tax evasion at the 1968 Canadian Tax Foundation Con-
ference:
4. A taxpayer is a majority shareholder in a limited company
and he places his wife on the payroll although she does not in
fact work for the company. The identity of the wife is disclosed
in all accounting records.
5. A taxpayer forms a partnership with an infant son who
makes no contribution to the capital and does little or no work.
If the partnership agreement is bona fide apart from these
elements, is this tax evasion if it results in a lowering of the
total income tax paid by the partnership as against the
preceding proprietorship?"
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If these cases are regarded as 'borderline', one must
not be too surprised if taxpayers, with or without legal
advice, are able to devise similar 'borderline' cases. They
may also feel that rather than devise a borderline tran-
saction, they might just as well evade tax because the
'borderline' transaction appears to them to be a case of
tax evasion.
My own view is that the fact that a certain practice
is widely engaged in cannot give it legitimacy. I agree
with the Trade Union Council's General Council's state-
ment when it stated that it regarded "tax evasion as theft
and believe that it should be treated as such." 9 Unlike
some people who are convicted of welfare fraud,90 tax
evaders cannot be under any illusion as to whether they
are violating the law. Further, unlike many people who
commit welfare fraud,91 very few tax evaders could
78.
79.
80.
See Report, supra note 4.
See supra notes 11-13.
See, e.g., Swadron, Task Force on Employment Opportunities
for Welfare Recipients. Toronto: Ministry of Social and Family
Services, 1972; Men on Relief. Ottawa: Canadian Council on
Social Development, 1971; Barber, Welfare Policy in Manitoba:
A Report (Winnipeg, 1972).
81. See, e.g., Potvin, supra note 72; Estey, Gourlay and Laidlaw,
"Tax Offences - Liability of Taxpayers and Their Professional
Advisors," in Proceedings of the 21st Tax Conference, 1968.
Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1969, p. 25; Kucher, Pot-
vin and O'Brien, "Crimes Under the Income Tax Act," in Pro-
ceedings of the 29th Tax Conference, 1977. Toronto: Canadian
Tax Foundation, 1978, p. 838; Gourlay, Nathanson and Thors-
teinsson, "Tax Administration: Recent Developments and Some
Current Issues," in Proceedings of the 30th Tax Conference,
1978. Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1979.
82. It is appropriate to re-emphasize that we are talking about
estimates and thus the margin of error in these estimates may be
great; see text at note 6, supra.
83. Quoted in Ilersic, "Tax Evasion in the United Kingdom," [1979]
British Tax Rev. 93.
84. Gourlay, "Tax Abuse in Canada," 2 Canadian Taxation, in this
issue.
85. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1955. For the bizarre
notion that tax evasion is almost unknown in Canada, see D.J.
Johnston, Fiscalamity: How to Survive Canada's Tax Chaos.
Don Mills: Paper Jacks, 1974. The author, now President of the
Treasury Board writes, inter alia:
Many of the tax evasion schemes I have seen were proposed
by persons who have emigrated from Europe and who cling
to the European attitude toward tax evasion . . . To these
people it is not a crime.
Id., p. 11.
86. It might be argued that people on welfare might devise the same
rationalisation, with even greater force. However, welfare reci-
pients who contemplate fraud realise that their chances of being
caught are higher than those of the tax evader. Further, to the ex-
tent that recipients of welfare feel, as many do, that they are in
receipt of charity, they are less likely to steal from those people
who are giving them charity.
87. See notes 98 and 101, infra.
88. See his paper, Tax Offences - Liability of Taxpayers and their
Professional Advisers. Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation,
1968, pp. 25, 40.
89. Trades Union Council Economic Review, 1975, p. 97, quoted in
Field, et al., supra note 1, p. 167.
90. For example many women are in fact convicted of the crime
although this crime is nowhere defined.
91. See text at notes 58-59, supra.
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plead that they evaded taxes because of "brutal need." 9 2
Finally, I take the view that tax evasion is a particularly
reprehensible form of theft because many of the people
convicted of tax evasion are already able to deprive the
state of $30 billion through tax incentives9 3 and a fur-
ther enormous amount through tax planning and tax
avoidance. 94
I would like to consider what steps are taken
against tax evaders and to consider possible im-
provements in the operation of the system.
Prosecutions for Evasion and Civil Penalties. Bet-
ween April 1, 1978 and March 31, 1979 the Department
completed the investigation of 949 cases of suspected
tax evasion and levied $29,870,000 in taxes and civil
penalties. During the same period, 196 cases were pro-
secuted in the courts and fines of $2,543,000 were im-
posed." From my reading of the cases prosecuted, the
Department clearly seems to concentrate its attention on
taxpayers who avoid substantial sums of money. I ap-
plaud this exercise of prosecutorial discretion and only
wish that the same restraint prevailed in the area of
welfare abuse prosecutions.
I should mention at this point that according to
Statistics Canada 1973, the figures show that 14 out of
7,476 convicted of tax offences were sent to prison,
whereas 132 people out of 1,766 convicted under the
Unemployment Insurance Act were sent to prison.96 It
is impossible to justify this kind of inequality of treat-
ment.
Between April 1, 1978 and March 31, 1979, 1,801
individuals received civil penalties of $4,458,324 for
failing to file tax returns. In the same period, 17,728
were prosecuted and total fines of $1,818,473 were
levied.97
Audits. The amount of tax collected from in-
dividual taxpayers through the use of audits is set out
below: 98
Year # of Audits
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1978
88,743
90,025
NA
81,119
66,604
78,700
91,014
Tax Collected
$155,879,000
$153,240,000
NA
$240,867,689
$229,444,387
$327,901,000
$434,630,831
In terms of percentage, fewer tax returns were audited
in 1978 than in 1972. Indeed, the percentage of returns
audited has decreased from 0.93 per cent in 1971 to 0.62
per cent in 1976.
These figures are striking when set against those of
the United States IRS which audits about 1.8 million in-
dividual returns or about 2 per cent of the total number
of files returned. 99 Even this figure is considered
disgracefully low by some Congressmen. Congressman
Benjamin Rosenthal, in particular, has been extremely
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critical of the low number of individual returns
audited. 00
When we turn to corporate audits, the number of
corporations audited has gone down in the last five
years from 6.5 per cent to 4.6 per cent.' 0
In my view, there is an urgent need to increase
greatly the number of audits. This is especially the case
in light of the evidence of Mr. Bruce McDonald, Deputy
Minister, Taxation, Department of National Revenue,
that "Our expected minimum intake from spending a
dollar on auditing tax returns is to get $3 back."' 0 2
Tax Clearance Certificates. Unlike most countries,
Canada does not have a system of tax clearance cer-
[E]venhandedness in our treatment of
tax evaders and welfare abusers is not
only an ethical imperative; it is practical
politics.
tificates. As a result of this indefensible gap in the law
from 1967 to 1973, $19.78 million owing in taxes by
4,024 former residents was written off. 0 It is impossi-
ble to imagine that a loophole of this character would be
allowed to exist in any area of welfare law. Indeed, in
welfare litigation the government has sometimes closed
92. This vivid phrase was used by the United States Supreme Court
to describe the situation of those receiving welfare: see Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
93. See Tamagno, "Comparing Direct Spending and Tax Spending,"
1 Canadian Taxation (No. 4) 42 (1979).
94. To my knowledge, no one has attempted an estimate of the
amount of revenue lost through tax avoidance and tax planning
in Canada, the United Kingdom or the United States.
95. See Revenue Canada, Taxation, Inside Taxation. Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1978, p. 46.
96. See Statistics Canada, Statistics of Criminal and other Offences,
1973, Table B, Convictions of Offences Punishable on Summary
Conviction.
97. See supra note 95, p. 45.
98. Figures derived from Inside Taxation, supra note 95.
99. The figures for the number of individual audits in the financial
year ending 1978 were 1.8 million or 2.0 per cent of the total tax-
payers; see Time, Sept. 17, 1979. In the fiscal year ending 1979,
the number of audits had gone up to 2.13 per cent of all returns;
see The New York Times, April 13, 1980.
100. According to Mr. Singleton B. Wolfe, Assistant Commissioner
for Compliance at the IRs, at least 3.5 per cent of individual
returns should be audited, see The New York Times, April 13,
1980.
101. See statement by Mr. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Minister, Taxa-
tion Department of National Revenue before the Finance, Trade
and Economic Affairs Standing Committee, Tues. Nov. 13,
1979, vol. 10, 36. This state of affairs is truly remarkable when it
is realized that the number of sophisticated tax frauds has risen
remarkably during the last few years.
102. Id., p. 37. According to Mr. Singleton Wolfe, Assistant Com-
missioner for Compliance at the IRs and extra dollar spent on
auditing brings in $4 to $6 of additional revenue. If the extra
dollar were devoted to finding non-filers, the pay-off would be
12 to 1; see The New York Times, April 13, 1980.
103. See Pinos, "Take the Money and Run", 1 Canadian Taxation
(No. 1) 43 (1979).
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the 'loophole' before the decision in a particular case has
been handed down.10 4
Extending the Withholding Principle. At present
we apply the withholding principle only to wage earners.
The difficulty with this system is that whereas, in the
United States for example, 97 to 98 per cent of salaries
are reported by taxpayers, only 84 to 92 per cent of
dividends are reported as income, and only 60 to 64 per
cent of self-employment income is voluntarily
reported. 0 As Mr. Donald Lubick, Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury, has pointed out, the withholding prin-
ciple could be extended to other categories of income
such as interest or dividends. 0 6 The principle of infor-
mation reporting could be applied to transactions such
as tip income and barter transactions. 0 7 1In my view,
there is an urgent need to study the feasibility of adop-
ting such principles in this country. But, if we are unable
to require tax clearance certificates for departing
residents, then I am not sanguine as to our ability to ex-
tend the withholding principle.
I do not believe that we are making very strenuous
efforts to curb tax evasion. We seem unable to take even
small steps such as requiring a tax clearance certificate.
We conduct an extremely low number of audits even
when the evidence shows that the return on carrying out
audits is extremely high.' 0 We have also shown no in-
itiative in exploring new ways of preventing tax evasion.
I should like to make it clear that the principal respon-
sibility for our indifferent attitude does not lie with
Revenue Canada but with political leaders who spend
most of their time worrying about alleged abuses in the
unemployment insurance system,' 09 while giving very
little thought to the problem of tax evasion.
PART III Conclusion
It seems to me to be clear that the evidence shows
that we take a far more serious view of welfare abuse
than we do of tax evasion. The chief reason for this dif-
ference in treatment is that we regard tax evaders as
'productive' people, whereas we see people who are on
welfare as being 'non-productive'.
In the case of the 'productive' tax evader we are
afraid that we have imposed too high a rate of taxation
and our feelings about pursuing him or her are often
ambivalent. To be sure, we do not allow the tax evader
to escape scot-free, but we are not nearly as energetic as
we might be in making tax evasion more difficult. In
short, we fear that at least some tax evasion might be
justified because we have imposed 'penal' rates of taxa-
tion on say, doctors or engineers.I 10 We are afraid that
certain classes of productive workers will emigrate. In
my view this fear is fanciful; high-paid persons will not
emigrate because they already enjoy a tax haven in this
country.'''
It is true that recipients of public welfare are un-
productive and there is little prospect of their
emigrating. But it seems to me that there are two points
to be made here. In the first place, recipients of public
welfare need not be unproductive. Jobs could be
found for the disabled,11 2 we could regulate layoffs'3
and we could protect job security far more conscien-
tiously than we do at present.114 Second, I believe that
we pay a heavy price for abusing those who claim social
security benefits. People who are abused are likely to
lose respect for law and order: the violence that is done
to the social fabric by those who feel themselves to be
abused exceeds the loss of a few million dollars taken
from the state.'
In short, evenhandedness in our treatment of tax
evaders and welfare abusers is not only an ethical im-
perative, it is also practical politics.
104. The classic example is Re Fawcett and Board of Review (1973), 1
O.R. (2d) 772 (Ont. C.A.). See also Re Elliott and Attorney
General of Ontario (1973), 2 O.R. 534 (Ont. C.A.), a decision
which was immediately reversed by an amending regulation.
105. See the statement by Mr. Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury (Tax Policy) before the Subcommittee on Over-
sight of the House Ways and Means Committee, September 10,
1979, p. 3.
106. The IRS Report for 1976 estimated unreported interest income
at $5.4 billion to $9.4 billion and unreported dividends at $2.1
billion to $4.7 billion; see The New York Times, April 13, 1980.
107. In this connection, see the proposals made by Mr. Lubick, supra
note 105, pp. 4-5.
108. See text at note 102, supra.
109. Incredibly, even at the present time speeches are made by promi-
nent politicians emphasizing the need "to tighten up" the
Unemployment Insurance Act. I have argued above that the ad-
ministration of unemployment insurance is already too harsh;
see text at notes 29-48, supra.
110. To the best of my knowledge, there is no empirical evidence that
'penal' rates of taxation have caused large (or even small) scale
emigration from Canada.
111. See for example the reports of the National Council of Welfare,
supra note 2.
112. In this connection, see the remarkable Dutch Social Employment
Program described by Haveman, "The Dutch Social Employ-
ment Program," in Palmer (ed.), Creating Jobs: Public Employ-
ment Programs and Wage Subsidies. Washington: The Brook-
ings Institution, 1978, p. 241.
113. I regard the "extended notice" provisions required for mass
layoffs provided for example, in the Ontario Employment Stan-
dards Act, 1974, S.O. 1974, c. 112, Reg. 251 as being totally in-
adequate.
114. Note, for example, the derisory tariff of notice periods required
under the Employment Standards Act, 1974:
Length of Service Minimum Period of Notice
Between 3 months and 2 years One week
Between 2 and 5 years Two weeks
Between 5 and 10 years Four weeks
Over 10 years Eight weeks
See The Employment Standards Act, S.O. 1974, c. 112.
115. For an attempt to measure the economic costs of unemployment
(i.e., loss of production, loss of tax revenue and payment of
unemployment insurance benefits) in the United Kingdom bet-
ween 1974-77, see Burghes and Field, "The Cost of Unemploy-
ment," in F. Field (ed.), The Conscript Army: A Study of Bri-
tain's Unemployed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977,
p. 78. The authors do not estimate the other costs of unemploy-
ment - for example a higher crime rate, a higher rate of mental
illness and suicide and a higher incidence of marital breakdown.
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